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Who’s “Normal”? Class, Culture and Labour Politics in a Fragmented Britain 
 
Owen Smith’s declaration of “I’m normal” provoked one of the major controversies of the 2016 
Labour leadership contest. In the initial fallout most of the controversy focused on the alleged 
heteronormative content of buttressing his assertion with “I’ve got a wife and three children.” Less 
was stated about the revealing elements of the cultural politics of class in Smith’s statement. Smith 
claimed that “I can bring that normality, that sense of what our communities want.” 1 This was 
clearly situated within a cultural reading of class, community and “normality” which extends far 
beyond sexual orientation. Smith implicated this further in a later statement which got to the heart 
of fissures between Labour’s urban and traditional industrial working class support bases: 
 
“Well, I think Jeremy doesn't really understand sometimes, the way in which people have a 
very strong, perhaps socially conservative - conservative with a small c - sense of place. 
Sense of where they're from. I'm not sure I've heard him talking much about Scotland and 
identity, or Wales and identity or indeed about England and identity. 
 
“I suspect that Jeremy's got a rather more metropolitan sense of that, and that's not one I 
think that is central to the Labour tradition.”2 
 
Smith’s juxtaposition between Labour’s “metropolitan” leadership and the socially conservative 
working class from small town England, the South Wales valleys, and central Scotland, played into an 
argument which had been bolstered by the regionally and nationally polarised results of the EU 
referendum. However, these debates have a longer history in recent years including concern over 
the growth of the BNP and UKIP, and the rise of Scottish nationalism. Alarm in Labour circles has 
been spurred by these political forces’ claims to represent popular sentiment against a distant 
‘metropolitan elite’. The clearest and most consistent response to this has been Blue Labour which 
posits party renewal on “reconnecting with people as they are – as human beings who belong to 
families, localities and communities and who are embedded in shared traditions, interests and 
faiths.”3 In a less coherent form this theme has been a consistent presence within internal Labour 
discussion. Class has re-emerged as a key category in Labour discussion and it is quite clear that the 
traditional, as opposed to Blairite, right of the party sees it as a crucial factor in discussing future 
strategy. However, rather than conventional labour movement explanations of class predicated on a 
structural analysis of social conflict it is increasingly elements of cultural identities relating to 
consumption patterns and regional and national affiliations that are emphasised.  
 
To some extent this has the appearance of Raymond Williams’ “structure of feeling”; the different 
life-worlds and experiences of parts of the UK necessitate expressions in distinct political outlooks 
that reflect very distinct sets of cultural values embedded in social routines and communities.4 
Whilst the labour movement was without doubt historically built and sustained by making appeals 
based on common culture and life experiences, this was not the crux of its agenda.  The Labour Party 
was able to overcome divisions of far greater magnitude over ‘social issues’, and to deliver a 
relatively stable electoral coalition. It did so utilising arguments that placed class as a category 
viewed through the lens of wealth, power and resources, and convincing socially conservative 
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4 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (1961; reprint 2001: Peterborough, Onatrio: Broadview Press) p.64. 
constituencies that the benefit of workplace and societal empowerment outweighed the price of 
social reform. A Labour voting coalition of metropolitan professionals and industrial working class 
communities was constructed and sustained on this basis between the 1920s and 1970s. Over the 
long mid-twentieth century Labour was also able to present itself as a regional and national 
champion. Although this met with varying degrees of success over the period, in both Scotland and 
Wales Labour became viewed as a natural ‘national’ as well as class based voice; the party acted as a 
representative of distinct polities within the unitary state.5 Willie Ross, Secretary of State for 
Scotland between 1964 and 1970 and 1974 to 1976, personified this stance. Although known as “the 
hammer of the Nats”, and as a staunch opponent of devolution, he positioned himself as a champion 
of Scottish interests within the British state who was able to utilise his role and Labour government 
policy to achieve a favourable distribution of employment and investment in Scotland.6 
 
The state of the Union was not at the forefront of discussion over the fragmentation of a possible 
British road to socialism in the late 1970s despite the Scottish devolution referendum debacle of 
1979. Eric Hobsbawm’s famous diagnosis of the ‘Forward March of Labour Halted’ centred on how 
“a collection of localised industrial communities” had given way to “a growing division of workers 
into sectional groups” acting to secure limited economic gains.7  By the mid-1980s this debate had 
more definitely broadened into a consideration of how the labour movement should respond to an 
increasingly fragmenting UK. David Howell’s A Lost Left enunciated these concerns in a chapter on 
the strategic vantage that posited John Wheatley and the Scottish Labour Party’s embrace of a 
unitary British approach to socialism. His conclusion questioned the wisdom and possibility of the 
left maintaining an affiliation towards a multi-national British state through the labour movement 
defeats incurred under Thatcherism and the national political dynamics these stimulated.8 Howell’s 
perceptive analysis has become a living nightmare for Scottish Labour in recent years but elements 
of it are also present within the stultified discussion over region, English-ness and Britain. Within this 
discourse the foundations of Labour’s radical political legacy, and class identity, have been contested 
in party political terms. But class has been repositioned as an essentially cultural historical facet 
rather than a dynamic lived reality connected to the changing temporalities of British capitalism. 
 
This has been particularly apparent within the SNP’s successful attempt to claim ownership of the 
‘Labour tradition’ in Scotland. Mhairi Black, elected member of Paisley and Renfrewshire South at 
the general election in 2015, has sought to personify this, and did so most clearly in her maiden 
speech:  
 
I like many SNP members come from a traditional socialist Labour family and I have 
never been quiet in my assertion that I feel that it is the Labour party that left me, not 
the other way about. The SNP did not triumph on a wave of nationalism; in fact 
nationalism has nothing to do with what’s happened in Scotland. We triumphed on a 
wave of hope, hope that there was something different, something better to the 
Thatcherite neo-liberal policies that are produced from this chamber.9 
 
This narrative has been developed with references commonly relating to Scottish Labour having 
‘lost its way’, and becoming an enforcer of distant authority rather than a force for delivering 
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social change rooted in working class communities. It was epitomised when senior trade union 
activists involved in the 1971 Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) ‘work-in’ followed the trajectory 
of Jimmy Reid, the iconic leader of the dispute who died in 2010 having switched affiliation 
successively from Communist to Labour to SNP, by supporting Scottish independence at the 
2014 referendum. They promoted this position in an open letter to Scotland’s main tabloid, the 
Daily Record, in terms which underlined Labour’s failure to respond to deindustrialisation: “For 
decades, decisions to close the yards were taken by doctrinaire Tory and Labour governments 
who disregarded the hopes of the people who live here.”10 Left-wing independence referendum 
narratives and the support the SNP has gained on alleged ‘traditional Labour’ grounds also 
speak to their ossification. In particular, worker agency and activism of the variety that 
produced the UCS work-in are neglected in favour of a ‘civic nationalist’ politics that will 
allegedly continue to assert the loosely ascribed values and striving for “social justice” that 
these earlier struggles embodied.  
 
In the English context the same forces, deindustrialisation and labour movement decline, have 
similarly spurred an imaginary of the working class which is in large part historical. It is an 
outlook that ignores the contemporary realities of the adverse housing and labour market 
experiences that are reshaping class in Britain today in favour of a cultural juxtaposition 
between locations  that obviously lost from ‘globalization’ in small town England, and the 
‘metropolitan’ areas seen to have gained most from it. But unlike in Scotland there is no stable 
institutional apparatus or political rallying point for these impulses. An unstated confusion over 
where English and British national identity start and stop, and lack of a clear constitutional end 
to this agenda, has manifested itself in growing ‘culture war’ politics that have manifested 
themselves within the Labour Party. Key examples of this included the ‘white van man’ incident 
when now Shadow Defence Secretary, and MP for Islington South and Firnsbury, Emily 
Thornberry, was attacked for a tweet of a house surrounded by a white van and St George’s 
class.11 Another was when Wes Streeting, MP for Illford, opposed a decision to reject 
McDonald’s’ sponsorship of the Labour Party conference as indicative of prejudices against 
working class culinary habits: 
 
It smacks of a snobby attitude towards fast-food restaurants and people who work or eat at 
them. … McDonald’s may not be the trendy falafel bar that some people in politics like to 
hang out at but it's enjoyed by families across the country.12 
 
In both cases Labour’s left were presented as out of touch with working class feeling. Streeting 
suspended criticisms of McDonald’s tax affairs and employment practices to rally behind plebeian 
consumption patterns. Structural analysis and the possibility of mobilisation and change were 
dropped in favour of advancing an unlikely brand of fast food identity politics. In the case of Emily 
Thornberry the absence of a class politics based around questions of wealth and power was even 
more apparent. The ‘white van man’, who has historically been a folk character associated with small 
business, was ascribed an unproblematic working class identity which was fundamentally related to 
national affiliations and patriotism. Furthermore he was then juxtaposed to professional 
metropolitan types, regardless of their own employment situation, on grounds of cultural values.  
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Various forces within the English left have long sought to construct an alternative form of national 
identity, from E.P Thompson’s post-1956 ‘New Left’ mission to uncover a lost history of radicalism to 
Billy Bragg’s The Progressive Patriot.13 However, it seems unlikely that such a project can possibly 
succeed. As Paul Mason stated in his refutation of attempts to construct a positive English identity 
“what it means to be English is completely subordinate to class, region, ethnicity and local culture.”14 
It is precisely the subaltern character of the assertions of English-ness, and the complex combination 
of resentment and hope they harbour, that makes them both slippery from a Labour perspective, 
and also difficult to neatly contain within the framing for renewal project.  
  
Any such effort will need alertness to the realities of regional dispersion and distance. However, it 
will need a far greater awareness of the structural socioeconomic realities that have pushed it 
forward, and that are continuing to remake class and affect the metropolitan elements of Labour’s 
coalition every bit as much as within former industrial settlements. The most intellectually 
developed elements of the cultural class argument, Blue Labour, claim an origin in a Labour tradition 
of communitarian localism. However, their perspective is devoid of Labourism’s orientation towards 
workplace empowerment. Whatever elements of “’Small c’ conservatism” this contains, the implicit 
radicalism of a politics centred on disputing work and ownership and control of resources cannot be 
ignored. 15 Over the summer ongoing efforts to develop a proposal for federalism were suspended 
by the leadership contest. The risk of a class politics read in historicised terms is precisely to omit the 
key factors that could in fact unite the culturally polarised elements of a Labour electoral coalition.  
Corbyn’s emphatic victory obliges Labour left to puts forward its own response to the widespread 
feeling of disempowerment which is sensitive to facets of community and regional experience and 
identity. This will have to combine major proposals for constitutional reform and decentralisation, 
addressing the plight of both Scotland and Wales and English regions, with an agenda for economic 
democracy and the geographical redistribution of wealth and power.  
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